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The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures. At the United States border, however, 
sovereignty interests—namely who and what enters the 
country—allow for warrantless searches of property without 
probable cause. This Note explores the reach of the border 
exception to one category of property: electronic devices. At 
present, circuit courts disagree over what level of suspicion—
no suspicion or reasonable suspicion—applies to forensic 
searches of electronics. Courts do agree that manual searches, 
performed without the assistance of external equipment, 
merit no suspicion at all. The suspicion gap between manual 
and forensic searches reflects an assumption that all manual 
searches are cursory and hence violate a device owner’s 
privacy less than a forensic search. 
This Note argues that the existing line between forensic 
and manual searches should be reimagined; instead, 
electronic devices, such as smartphones, should be separated 
out from other electronic devices, such as cameras, and be 
subject to a reasonable suspicion standard irrespective of the 
nature of the search, forensic or manual. Redrawing the line 
between devices themselves recognizes that certain 
electronics (e.g. cameras) are more analogous to traditional 
luggage and therefore should receive the same treatment at 
the border where suspicionless searches are permitted. Like 
luggage, one can curate these devices: it is possible to know 
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and choose what is inside. As the attenuation of the link 
between the device in question and traditional luggage 
expands, so too should the suspicion required. Smartphones 
and like devices should not be searched without reasonable 
suspicion. Finally, this Note concludes by recommending that 
the Customs and Border Protection directive, subject to 
review and modification every three years, be revised to 
distinguish between the two groups of electronic devices and 
account for the privacy concerns unique to the smartphone 
and related devices group.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Remove the 3-1-1 liquids bag and place it in the bin. 
Ensure pockets are empty (keys, tissues, currency, 
wallets, cell phones, etc.) and remove bulky jewelry 
(valuable items can be placed in carry-on). Remove 
your shoes and place them directly on the X-ray belt. 
Remove personal electronic devices larger than a cell 
phone from your carry-on bag and place them into a 
bin with nothing placed on or under them for X-ray 
screening (E.g. laptops, tablets, e-readers and 
handheld game consoles). Remember to check the bins 
and collect all belongings after going through 
screening.1  
Anyone who travels is familiar with this routine. X-ray 
screening of cell phones, laptops, and iPads is standard 
procedure at the airport.2 However, people are less familiar 
with secondary manual and forensic searches of electronics.3 
The U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) defines a 
manual or “basic search” as an examination of an electronic 
device by an officer with the possibility of review and analysis 
 
1 Travel Checklist, TRANSP. SECURITY ADMIN., 
https://www.tsa.gov/travel/travel-tips/travel-checklist [https://perma.cc/C4 
5H-P7RB]. 
2 See Michelle Higgins, Security Ahead? Pack Patience, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 19, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/24/travel/24pracsecu 
rity.html [https://perma.cc/9CW5-UWBC]. 
3 See generally Derek Hawkins, The Cybersecurity 202: Warrantless 
Device Searches at the Border are Rising. Privacy Advocates are Suing, 
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of information encountered at the border.4 In other words, this 
includes opening and scrolling-through a cell phone’s 
contents, including call history, text messages, photos, apps— 
such as WhatsApp or Facebook Messenger—and social media 
accounts.5 A forensic search or “advanced search” is defined 
as “any search in which an Officer connects external 
equipment . . . not merely to gain access to the device, but to 
review, copy, and/or analyze its contents.”6 A forensic search 
is not an action to determine if a device functions, to 
determine if the device conceals physical contraband within, 
or to review information voluntarily provided in electronic 
format, such as an airline e-ticket.7 Additionally, it is limited 
to data found on the physical device at the time of travel.8 
Consequently, data stored on the cloud is exempt from 
search.9 
In 2016, CBP searched the electronic devices of 19,051 
international travelers, both inbound and outbound.10 The 
 
4 See U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., CBP DIRECTIVE NO. 3340-049A, 
BORDER SEARCH OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES § 5.1.3 (2018) [hereinafter CBP 
DIRECTIVE], https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2018-
Jan/CBP-Directive-3340-049A-Border-Search-of-Electronic-Media-
Compliant.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z389-P2M7].  
5 Daniel Victor, What Are Your Rights if Border Agents Want to Search 
Your Phone?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/14/business/border-enforcement-airport-
phones.html [https://perma.cc/35JM-XRH8]. While a border agent cannot 
force an individual to unlock a password protected device, she may seize the 
device if someone refuses to do so. See id. 
6 CBP DIRECTIVE, supra note 4, § 5.1.4. 
7 See id. § 2.3.  
8 Id. § 5.1.2. 
9 See id.; see also CBP DIRECTIVE, supra note 4, § 5.1.2; Brian Fung, 
Travelers Just Won Back a Bit of Their Privacy at the Border, WASH. POST 
(July 14, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/ 
2017/07/14/travelers-just-won-back-a-bit-of-their-privacy-at-the-border/ 
[https://perma.cc/PM2U-WRZN]. 
10 Press Release, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., CBP Releases Updated 
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following year, CBP reported 30,200 international travelers 
had their electronics searched, an increase of almost sixty 
percent from 2016.11 Such searches are likely to continue to 
climb given the unprecedented rise in electronics use12 and 
the sustained popularity of the United States as a travel 
destination.13 Put briefly, CBP officials are likely to 
increasingly scrutinize international travelers’ essential 
electronics.14 
According to the CBP’s January 2018 directive, which is up 
for review in January 2021, the searches are “essential to 
enforcing law at the U.S. border and to protecting border 
security.”15 They assist in detecting evidence related to 
terrorism, human and bulk cash smuggling, contraband, and 
child pornography.16 The searches also seek to expose 
 
11 Id. 
12 Ninety-five percent of Americans now own a cell phone. Mobile Fact 
Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 5, 2018), http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-
sheet/mobile/ [https://perma.cc/Q9YJ-9NU8]. Seventy-seven percent have a 
smartphone, a spike from thirty-five percent in 2011. Id. Non-cell phone 
electronics use is also climbing; nearly three quarters of American adults 
now own desktop or laptop computers, over one-half own tablet computers, 
and about one-fifth own e-reader devices. Id. (showing that seventy-three 
percent of U.S. adults own desktop/laptop computers and fifty-three percent 
own tablets, as of January 10, 2018, and that twenty-two percent own e-
readers as of November 6, 2016).  
13 The United States remains a popular travel choice, as the largest 
destination for global long-haul travel and third-largest destination for 
overall global travel. Fact Sheet: International Inbound Travel to the U.S. 
(2017), U.S. TRAVEL ASS’N, https://www.ustravel.org/system/files/media_ 
root/document/Research_Fact-Sheet_International-Inbound.pdf [https://per 
ma.cc/9K3F-DRAG] (last updated Oct. 2018). Global long-haul travel is 
travel between countries from separate geographical regions (e.g. between 
the United States and Germany) and excludes inter-regional travel (e.g. 
between the U.S. and Canada). Id. The United States welcomed an 
unprecedented 75.9 million international visitors in 2016. OECD, OECD 
TOURISM TRENDS AND POLICIES 2018 (2018), https://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/sites/tour-2018-en/table-103.html?itemId=/content/component/ 
tour-2018-table103-en [https://perma.cc/E2YJ-M3YW]. 
14 See Hawkins, supra note 3.  
15 CBP DIRECTIVE, supra note 4, § 1. 
16 Id. Searching such devices can improve risk assessments of 
individual travelers and information sharing with the federal government 
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information about financial and commercial crimes, including 
those involving copyright, trademark, and export control 
violations.17 While these searches have many purported 
security benefits, they also raise privacy concerns for a 
number of stakeholders who share an interest in the 
electronics of their data.18 While the vast majority of persons 
searched are international visitors,19 this Note focuses on the 
constitutional protections of citizens and permanent legal 
residents. Although device owners’ privacy interests are 
underscored first and foremost, third parties such as business 
entities are also implicated. Company trade secrets or 
intellectual property could be at risk when employees leave 
the country on business.20 Furthermore, business personnel 
 
responsible for analyzing terrorist threats. Id. CBP claims that the searches 
are “integral to a determination of an individual’s intentions upon entry and 
provide additional information relevant to admissibility under the 
immigration laws.” Id.  
17 Id.  
18 One case particularly exemplifies the diversity of individuals subject 
to search. In Alasaad v. Nielson, plaintiffs included an artist, an employee 
of NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory, journalists from Massachusetts and 
Virginia, a New York filmmaker, and a college professor and former captain 
of the U.S. Air Force from Florida. See Alasaad v. Nielsen, No. 17-CV-11730, 
2018 WL 2170323, at *5–8 (D. Mass. May 9, 2018). 
19 A senior CBP official reported that approximately twenty percent of 
travelers whose devices are inspected are U.S. citizens. Nick Miroff, U.S. 
Customs Agents Are Searching More Cellphones – Including Those 





20 See Sara H. Jodka, If You Don’t Need It, Don’t Pack It: Border 
Searches of Mobile Devices, NAT’L L. REV. (Mar. 21, 2018), 
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/if-you-don-t-need-it-don-t-pack-it-
border-searches-mobile-devices [https://perma.cc/CW83-5FCW]; see also 
Daniel R. Levy, It’s a Brave New World: Protecting Trade Secrets When 
Traveling Abroad with Electronic Devices, TRADE SECRETS & EMP. MOBILITY 
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may travel with electronics that do not belong to them, but to 
their employer.21  
These weighty privacy considerations are prompting some 
individuals to turn to the courts for guidance.22 Federal judges 
across the United States are wrestling with the tension 
between national security and privacy.23 Currently, all circuit 
courts agree that no suspicion is required for manual 
searches.24 They split, however, over what level of suspicion 
is required for forensic searches, no suspicion or reasonable 
suspicion.25 This Note reimagines the line drawn between 
manual and forensic searches and instead argues for a new 
divide between types of electronic devices, with less suspicion 
required for fully curated26 devices that are most analogous to 
traditional luggage.  
Part II of this Note traces the origins of the Fourth 
Amendment right against unlawful search and seizure and 
the birth of the border exception, and introduces the Supreme 
Court’s holdings on cell phone searches outside of the border 
context in United States v. Riley27 and United States v. 
 
21 See Thomas Lonardo, Doug White, Tricia P. Martland & Alan Rea, 
Legal Issues Regarding Digital Forensic Examiners Third Party Consent to 
Search, 6 J. DIGITAL FORENSICS, SECURITY & L., no. 4, 2011, at 19, 22. In such 
cases where sensitive business documents are found, the CBP directive 
instructs its officers to “treat such information as business confidential 
information and . . . protect that information from unauthorized disclosure.” 
CBP DIRECTIVE, supra note 4, § 5.2.3. The directive recognizes that the 
Trade Secrets Act, the Privacy Act, and other laws and CBP policies may 
inform the handling of such information. Id.  
22 See Alasaad, No. 17-CV-11730, 2018 WL 2170323, at *1 (listing ten 
U.S. citizens and one lawful permanent resident whose devices were 
searched at U.S. ports of entry and have subsequently sought declaratory 
and injunctive relief). 
23 See, e.g., United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 150 (4th Cir. 2018) 
(Wilkinson, J., concurring) (listing questions which add color to this tension 
at the border). 
24 See infra Section III.A.1. 
25 See infra Part III.  
26 Just as a suitcase is curated, in the sense that the owner chooses 
what she does and does not wish to pack, so too are certain electronic 
devices. See infra Section V.B.2. 
27 Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014). 
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Carpenter.28 Part III examines the existing circuit split over 
the level of suspicion required for forensic searches of 
electronic travel items. Part IV revisits the border exception 
and suggests a partial untethering of government interests in 
favor of individuals’ privacy interests in smartphones. Finally, 
Part V agrees with the Fourth and Ninth Circuits’ 
requirements29 of at least reasonable suspicion for forensic 
searches of smartphones and laptops, but proposes that the 
type of device, not the type of search (manual or forensic) 
should inform the level of suspicion required. Specifically, this 
Note argues that searches of devices that are curated—such 
as digital cameras—should be exempt from any enhanced 
suspicion, but searches of devices that are not fully curated—
such as smartphones—should be subject to a reasonable 
suspicion standard.  
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND 
UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES 
A. Katz and the Reasonable Expectation Standard 
The Fourth Amendment provides that:  
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated and no 
Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized.30 
In Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court stated that 
these Fourth Amendment protections applied to “people not 
places.”31 But what right to protection are people entitled to? 
 
28 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
29 For a full discussion of these requirements, see infra Part V. 
30 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
31 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (holding that the 
government’s eavesdropping and recording of a man’s spoken words in a 
public telephone booth constituted an unreasonable search and seizure, not 
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The Court cautioned that the Amendment is not a “general 
constitutional right to privacy.”32 Instead, it protects against 
certain governmental intrusions, while leaving any protection 
for a person’s general right to be left alone to the individual 
states.33 While “people, not places” are protected, courts 
examine references to specific places to determine whether a 
person is afforded protection from particularized 
governmental intrusion.34 In his concurring opinion in Katz, 
Justice Harlan articulated a two-step test that the Supreme 
Court has since adopted as governing law.35 To determine 
whether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred, the 
Court engages in an inquiry that is both subjective and 
objective. First, the person must possess an “actual 
(subjective) expectation of privacy.”36 Second, that expectation 
must “be one that society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable.’”37  
Justice Harlan’s two-fold requirement in Katz has been 
echoed in the Supreme Court’s recent holding in Carpenter v. 
United States: “When an individual ‘seeks to preserve 
something as private,’ and his expectation of privacy is ‘one 
that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable,’ . . . official 
intrusion into that private sphere generally qualifies as a 
search and requires a warrant supported by probable 
cause.”38 However, the Katz test for legitimate expectations of 
privacy supplements “‘the traditional property-based 
 
due to location alone, but because of his justifiable reliance upon privacy 
therein). 
32 Id. at 350 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
33 Id. at 350–51. 
34 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
35 See Byrd v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1518, 1526 (2018); see also Kyllo 
v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001). 
36 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
37 Id. For example, in the case of the telephone booth in Katz, the 
defendant’s expectation was “reasonable” because of the nature of the booth: 
When it is occupied, the caller closes the door and may assume that the 
conversation is not overheard. Id. at 361. 
38 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018) (citing 
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979)).  
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understanding of the Fourth Amendment.’”39 Historically, the 
doctrine was “tied to common-law trespass”40 and guarded 
against the Government “obtain[ing] information by 
physically intruding on a constitutionally protected area[.]”41 
During colonial times, general warrants and writs of 
assistance permitted British officers to forage through homes 
in pursuit of evidence of criminal activity.42 The Fourth 
Amendment’s plain language—“houses, papers, and 
effects”43—clearly demonstrates the Framers’ resolve to 
protect certain forms of tangible property, especially those 
found in the sanctity of one’s home, from the Government’s 
“arbitrary power”44 and “a too permeating police 
surveillance.”45 
The Supreme Court has found reasonable expectations of 
privacy in a number of sub-spheres: car ownership and 
possession;46 buses;47 cell phone records;48 burned 
buildings;49 and porches,50 among others. Even without a 
 
39 Byrd, 138 S. Ct. at 1526 (citing Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 11 
(2013)). 
40 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012). 
41 Id. at 406 n.3 (2012). 
42 See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014). 
43 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
44 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886). 
45 United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948). 
46 See Byrd v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1518, 1527 (2018) (holding that 
a driver in lawful possession or control of a rental car, yet not listed as an 
authorized driver on the rental agreement, retains her otherwise reasonable 
expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment). Note that mobile 
homes are afforded less protection under the Fourth Amendment because 
they are readily movable before the execution of a warrant. See California 
v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 393 (1985).  
47 See Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 335 (2000) (holding that a 
bus passenger’s privacy expectation for his carry-on bag was reasonable). 
48 See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018) (holding 
that a seizure and search of cell phone records revealing location and 
movements of a user over the course of 127 days required a warrant). 
49 See Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 297 (1984) (holding that 
reasonable expectations of privacy may be found in fire-damaged premises). 
50 See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (2013) (finding that the front 
porch of a home is part of the home itself and not subject to warrantless 
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recognized common law property interest in the place 
searched, a person may nonetheless claim a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in it.51 In doing so, however, she must 
claim more than a mere legitimate presence on the premises 
searched.52 Presence without more “creates too broad a gauge 
for measurement of Fourth Amendment rights.”53 The Court 
illustrated this point with two hypotheticals in Rakas v. 
Illinois: first, a visitor not welcome in a specified area of her 
host’s home that is searched (e.g., the basement) and second, 
a visitor who enters the host’s home one minute before the 
search and leaves one minute after.54 In both scenarios, the 
visitor has no legitimate expectation of privacy in the 
premises.  
Assuming a valid and reasonable expectation of privacy 
exists, “no [w]arrants shall issue but upon probable cause.”55 
While the Fourth Amendment does not elaborate further, in 
Illinois v. Gates, the Supreme Court employed a practical, 
non-technical, totality-of-the-circumstances standard 
consistent with probabilities inherent in the “factual and 
practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable 
and prudent men . . . act.”56 In the context of searches, 
probable cause exists when “there is a fair probability that 
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular 
 
investigation by drug-sniffing dogs). In her concurring opinion, Justice 
Elena Kagan added that people have a heightened expectation of privacy 
not only within their homes, but in also in areas immediately surrounding 
their homes. Id. at 13 (Kagan, J., concurring). The Court, by contrast, has 
declined to find reasonable expectations of privacy in areas above homes, 
such as airspace. See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986); 
see also Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 445 (1989). 
51 See, e.g., Byrd, 138 S. Ct. at 1527 (citing Jones v. United States, 362 
U.S. 257, 259 (1960); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 
(1967); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968); Minnesota v. 
Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 98 (1990)). 
52 See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 147–48 (1978). 
53 Id. at 142.  
54 See id.  
55 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
56 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983). 
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place.”57 When issuing a warrant, the magistrate judge relies 
on all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before her, 
including the credibility of hearsay information provided.58 
Bare conclusory statements are insufficient.59 For example, a 
sworn statement that affiant “has cause to suspect and does 
believe that” illegal liquor is located on the premises does not 
pass muster.60 In Gates, however, an anonymous letter 
regarding defendant’s illicit drug activities, corroborated in 
part by federal agents, sufficed to meet probable cause.61 
B. Warrantless Search of Electronics 
As electronics ownership has become virtually 
ubiquitous,62 the law surrounding reasonable electronics 
searches gains salience. The Supreme Court required 
warrants issued upon probable cause for unreasonable 
searches of electronics in two landmark cases.63  
First, in 2014, the Court held that a warrantless search 
and seizure of cell phone contents during an arrest generally 
violates the Fourth Amendment.64 Riley v. California 
consolidated two cases, the first of which involved a man 
arrested on weapons charges whose pockets were searched 
and cell phone seized incident to the arrest.65 The officer who 
seized Riley’s phone noticed the repeated use of a term 
associated with a street gang.66 Two hours later, a detective 
further examined the phone at the police station and found 
photographs and videos providing at least partial basis for 
 
57 Id. at 238. 
58 See id. 
59 See id. at 239. 
60 See Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 44, 47 (1933). 
61 See Gates, 462 U.S. at 243. 
62 See Mobile Fact Sheet, supra note 12. 
63 See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018); Riley v. 
California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014). 
64 Riley, 573 U.S. at 386. 
65 Id. at 378–79. 
66 Id. at 379. 
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subsequent charges in connection with a shooting that 
occurred a few weeks prior.67  
The Court stated that “[i]n the absence of a warrant, a 
search is reasonable only if it falls within a specific exception 
to the [Fourth Amendment’s] warrant requirement.”68 A 
warrantless search incident to lawful arrest is one such 
exception.69 The lawful arrest, however, is limited by certain 
conditions. The Court cited the foundational search-incident-
to-arrest case, Chimel v. California, for the requirement that 
a search of an area within the arrestees “immediate control” 
either (1) promotes officer safety or (2) preserves evidence.70 
The Court, however, distinguished the search of cell phones, 
finding that the digital data stored on them presented neither 
of the two Chimel risks: It cannot itself be used as a weapon 
to harm an officer, and remote-wiping may be fully prevented 
by disconnecting a phone from its network.71 Moreover, the 
Court rejected the government’s assertion that a search of cell 
phone data is “materially indistinguishable” from similar 
searches of physical items: “That is like saying a ride on 
horseback is materially indistinguishable from a flight to the 
moon.”72 Both are means of getting from point A to point B, 
but, beyond that, do not belong together. The Court further 
explained that categorically, modern cell phones implicate 
 
67 Id. Riley was ultimately charged with firing at an occupied vehicle, 
assault with a semiautomatic firearm, and attempted murder. Id. The jury 
convicted him of all three counts and the trial court sentenced him to fifteen 
years to life in prison, an enhanced sentence based on the aggravating factor 
of committing crimes for the benefit of a street gang. Id. at 380. 
68 Id. at 382 (citing Kentucky v. King, 181 S. Ct. 1849, 1856–57 (2011)). 
69 Id. The Court points to Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), 
overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), as the case that first 
recognized the government’s right to search arrestees without a warrant.  
70 Id. at 382–83 (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 
(1969), abrogated on other grounds by Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 
(2011)). The Court in Chimel found a warrantless search of man’s entire 
house incident to proper arrest to be unlawful because it was beyond his 
person or the area where incriminating evidence could be found. Chimel, 
395 U.S. at 768. 
71 Riley, 573 U.S. at 386–90. 
72 Id. at 393. 
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privacy concerns that surpass those attached to a cigarette 
pack or wallet, items traditionally seized post-arrest.73 It 
cautioned against relying too heavily on the term “cell phone,” 
likening them instead to minicomputers with telephone 
capacity.74 To support the Court’s hard line drawing, it cited 
cell phones’ storage capacity, a unique element of 
pervasiveness, and qualitative differences, such as browsing 
history.75  
Four years later, the Supreme Court revisited cell phones 
in a different context: cell-site records. One function that cell 
phones perform is continuous connection to a set of radio 
antennas or cell sites.76 When a cell phone connects to such a 
site, it leaves behind a time stamped record.77 These records 
are collected and stored by wireless carriers for business 
purposes.78  
In United States v. Carpenter, prosecutors were granted 
court orders to obtain cell phone records of robbery suspects 
identified by the FBI pursuant to the Stored Communications 
Act.79 The wireless carrier’s production revealed 12,898 
location points cataloging defendant Timothy Carpenter’s 
movements over 127 days.80 Carpenter moved to suppress the 
data, claiming that use of the location points was an 
unconstitutional search under the Fourth Amendment.81 The 
lower courts rejected his contention, finding no reasonable 
expectation of privacy because Carpenter shared his location 
data with his wireless carriers.82 
 
73 Id. 
74 Id.  
75 Id. at 393–95. For a further discussion of these arguments, see infra 
Section V.B. 
76 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211 (2018). 
77 Id. This record is known as cell-site location information. Id. 
78 Id. at 2212.  
79 Id.  
80 Id.  
81 Id.  
82 Id. at 2212–13. If one voluntarily shares or turns over information to 
a third-party, she loses a legitimate expectation of privacy in such 
information under the third-party doctrine. Id. at 2216 (citing Smith v. 
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979)). 
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In its reversal, the Supreme Court discussed two lines of 
intersecting cases addressing a person’s expectation of 
privacy: (1) in her physical location and movements, and (2) 
in information voluntarily turned over to third parties.83 With 
respect to the first issue, the Court again stressed the one-of-
a-kind nature of the digital data at issue. While rudimentary 
car tracking by beeper does not constitute a search,84 the 
Court found the cell-site tracking here to be more closely 
aligned with the unconstitutional GPS tracking device used in 
United States v. Jones.85 The second point reflected a common-
sense doctrine, based on an understanding that one loses her 
expectation of privacy in information upon voluntarily 
sharing it with a third party. The Court applied this logic in 
the past to bank records in United States v. Miller86 and 
outgoing phone numbers dialed on a landline telephone in 
Smith v. Maryland.87 In Carpenter, however, the Court 
confronted a “new phenomenon”88—one in which the phone 
 
83 Id. at 2215–16.  
84 See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983) (“A person 
travelling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another.”).  
85 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012). In Jones, FBI agents’ 
installation of a GPS tracking device on Jones’s vehicle and subsequent 
monitoring for twenty-eight days constituted an illegal trespass. Id. at 403–
04, 412. While the case was decided on the basis of physical trespass, 
concurring justices recognized “longer term GPS monitoring in 
investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy.” Id. at 
430 (Alito, J., concurring). 
86 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976). In Miller, the Court 
held that the government’s subpoena of Miller’s bank records during a tax 
evasion investigation did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 445. 
Miller’s checks, deposit slips, and monthly statements were not confidential 
communications because Miller used them in commercial transactions 
observed by bank employees in the ordinary course of business. See id. at 
442. 
87 See Smith, 442 U.S. at 741, 743. Use of pen registers—devices that 
record the outgoing numbers dialed by a certain phone—did not constitute 
a search because telephone subscribers know that the numbers they dial 
are used by the telephone company for a variety of business reasons. Id. at 
744. 
88 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216. 
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and its user are inseparable, resulting in not merely a list of 
dialed digits, but a comprehensive constellation of a person’s 
every movement. Put differently, the revealing nature of cell-
site records is incomparable to bank checks or telephone call 
logs. Moreover, cell-site data is not “shared” in the traditional 
sense; the only affirmative act required on behalf of the user 
is to power on the device.89 In sum, the Court held that the 
government’s acquisition of Carpenter’s cell-site records 
without a warrant supported by probable cause constituted a 
search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.90 
C. The Border Exception  
The Fourth Amendment protects against warrantless, 
unreasonable searches and seizures when travelling from one 
state into another within the continental United States.91 But 
this protection recedes at the border, where warrantless 
searches of property without probable cause are permitted.92 
At the border, the sovereign’s long-standing right to control 
“who and what may enter the country” reigns supreme, 
“subject to substantive limitations imposed by the 
Constitution[.]”93 In United States v. Flores-Montano, the 
Supreme Court instructed that it is this very sovereign right 
that makes these searches “reasonable simply by virtue of the 
fact that they occur at the border.”94  
Several constitutionally enumerated powers underlie the 
government’s border search authority: Congress’ “‘broad 
powers . . . to prevent smuggling and to prevent prohibited 
articles from entry,’ under its plenary authority ‘[t]o lay and 
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises,’ ‘[t]o regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations,’ and ‘[t]o establish a [ ] 
 
89 See id. at 2220.  
90 See id. at 2221. 
91 See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925). 
92 See id. at 153–54. 
93 United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 620 (1977).  
94 United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152–53 (2004) 
(quoting Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 616). 
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uniform Rule of Naturalization.’”95 At the core of these 
exceptional powers, however, is the accepted premise that 
“[t]he Government’s interest in preventing the entry of 
unwanted persons and effects is at its zenith at the 
international border.”96 This interest is motivated by a need 
to protect United States citizens from “the introduction of 
contraband into this country”97—including child pornography 
or narcotics.  
Some privacy rights, however, survive the border 
exception. Indeed, an individual’s privacy rights are not 
usurped in their entirety, but “[b]alanced against the 
sovereign’s interests.”98 While the Supreme Court has never 
required probable cause for searches at the border, the Court 
has applied this balancing test to extend a reasonable 
suspicion requirement to “highly intrusive searches of the 
person;” “searches of property [that] are . . . so destructive;” 
and searches conducted in “a particularly offensive 
manner.”99 Reasonable suspicion is a step below probable 
cause—it is less than a showing of a fair probability of 
criminal evidence, but more than a “hunch”100 of criminal 
activity.  
In United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, the Supreme 
Court held that prolonged detention of a traveler at the border 
is justified if customs officers “reasonably suspect that the 
traveler is smuggling contraband in her alimentary canal.”101 
The traveler in this case, a Colombian woman travelling from 
Bogotá to Los Angeles, swallowed eighty-eight balloons of 
 
95 United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1232 (11th Cir. 2018) 
(internal citations omitted). 
96 Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152 (emphasis added).  
97 United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985). 
98 Id. at 539. This balance, however, is “struck much more favorably to 
the Government at the border.” Id. at 540.  
99 Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152, 154 n.2, 156 (quotations omitted). 
The Court, however, failed to specify the circumstances under which a 
search would be considered unreasonable because it was conducted in a 
“particularly offensive manner.” Id. at 154 n.2. 
100 Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 542. 
101 Id. at 541 (emphasis added).  
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cocaine.102 While the concern for the protection of the integrity 
of the United States border from the entry of unwanted 
narcotics is undeniable, a “particularized and objective basis 
for suspecting the [defendant]”103 is nonetheless required to 
justify such an extreme invasion of personal privacy and 
dignity inherent in an alimentary canal search.104 
The focal point of the Court’s discussion, however, remains 
“reasonableness.”105 But what is reasonable at the border? 
The answer lies in the totality of the circumstances 
surrounding the search and the nature of the search itself.106 
Scope and duration of the privacy deprivation are but two 
factors in a larger calculus.107 The starting line, however, is 
not evenly marked across the board. Because the 
government’s legitimate interest at the border meets a 
traveler’s diminished interest, the traveler’s privacy 
deprivation must overcome the government’s sovereignty-
based advantage before it is considered unreasonable. 
III. CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER LEVEL OF SUSPICION 
REQUIRED FOR FORENSIC SEARCHES 
Section II.B discussed the Supreme Court’s view on a 
warrant requirement for cell phone searches in two limited 
contexts: search-incident-to-arrest and cell-site records.108 
The Supreme Court, however, has yet to weigh in on such a 
requirement for border searches.109 Instead, the various 
 
102 Id. at 532–33. 
103 United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–18 (1981). 
104 See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 541–42. 
105 See United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 960 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(en banc) (citing Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 538). 
106 See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 537 (citing New Jersey v. 
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337–42 (1985)). 
107 See Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 960 (citing United States v. Jacobsen, 
466 U.S. 109, 124 (1984)). 
108 See supra Section II.B. 
109 See Alasaad v. Nielsen, No. 17-CV-11730, 2018 WL 2170323, at *17 
(D. Mass. May 9, 2018) (noting that neither the Supreme Court nor the First 
Circuit have yet held that a warrant is required for any type of border 
search). 
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Courts of Appeals that have faced the question have come to 
contrary conclusions. This Part examines the existing circuit 
split between the Fourth and Ninth Circuits on one side, and 
the Eleventh Circuit on the other, over the required level of 
suspicion necessary for forensic searches of electronics at the 
U.S. border. 
A. Fourth and Ninth Circuits Require Reasonable 
Suspicion 
The first approach to searches of electronic devices at the 
border is currently shared among the Fourth and Ninth 
Circuits. Both require reasonable suspicion for forensic 
searches of electronic devices at the border.  
1. Ninth Circuit 
In United States v. Cotterman, the Ninth Circuit broke 
ground in requiring reasonable suspicion for forensic 
searches.110 Howard Cotterman, a U.S. citizen, presented 
himself with his wife at a port of entry in Lukeville, Arizona 
for admission into the United States from Mexico.111 The 
Treasury Enforcement Communications System identified 
Cotterman as a sex offender based on two prior child sex crime 
convictions from 1992 and flagged him as potentially involved 
in child sex tourism.112 During a secondary inspection, border 
agents retrieved two laptop computers and three digital 
cameras; the inspection revealed family and other personal 
photos, in addition to password protected files.113 In Tucson, 
an Immigration and Customers Enforcement (“ICE”) agent 
copied the laptops’ hard drives and ran software to examine 
their contents.114 The agent released the camera, but 
scrutinized the laptops further.115 Mr. Cotterman’s laptop 
housed seventy-five images of child pornography within 
 
110 See Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 956–57. 
111 See id. at 957.  
112 See id. at 956–57. 
113 Id. at 957–58. 
114 Id. at 958. 
115 Id. 
  
No. 2:696] CAN WE CURATE IT? 715 
unallocated space and 378 images of child pornography 
contained in twenty-three password-protected files.116 
After a grand jury indicted Cotterman for offenses related 
to child pornography, Cotterman moved to suppress the 
laptop evidence.117 The district court granted Cotterman’s 
motion.118 But the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that the 
secondary site forensic laptop search did not require 
reasonable suspicion.119 In a final twist, the Ninth Circuit 
sitting en banc endorsed a reasonable suspicion requirement 
due to the “comprehensive and intrusive nature of a forensic 
examination,” but Cotterman still lost because the court found 
that the totality of the factors met the requirement.120 The 
question for the court, was not so much “where,” but “how” the 
search was conducted.121 The “how” at issue failed the 
reasonableness test. The majority referred to the forensic 
search as a “computer strip search”122 “akin to reading a diary 
line by line looking for mention of criminal activity—plus 
looking at everything the writer may have erased.”123  
While eschewing forensic searches without reasonable 
suspicion, the court acknowledged the continued practice of 
suspicionless manual searches approved in United States v. 
 
116 Id. at 958–59. 
117 Id. at 959. 
118 Id. 
119 United States v. Cotterman, 637 F.3d 1068, 1083–84 (9th Cir. 2011). 
120 Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 962, 970. The district court sentenced 
Cotterman to thirty-five years in prison for child exploitation offenses. See 
Man Sentenced to 35 Years in Prison for Child Pornography Offenses, U.S. 
DEP’T. OF JUSTICE (Sept. 30, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/usao-az/pr/man-
sentenced-35-years-prison-child-pornography-offenses [https://perma.cc/ 
UQ8P-G4NA]. 
121 Despite its finding of a reasonable suspicion requirement, the Ninth 
Circuit rejected Cotterman’s claim that the second forensic search 
constituted an unlawful “extended border search” merely because his 
devices were transported and examined beyond the border, since despite 
being permitted to depart the border inspection station after the initial 
search, neither Mr. Cotterman nor his wife cleared customs with their 
property. Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 961. Thus, he did not regain his 
expectation of privacy as he would have with re-entry. See id. at 962. 
122 Id. at 966. 
123 Id. at 962–63.  
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Arnold.124 In Arnold, CBP agents’ search of two laptop folders 
entitled “Kodak Pictures” and “Kodak Memories” was 
unintrusive because the officers merely had the laptop “booted 
up” for a quick look inside.125 As such, while the court 
advanced the debate over privacy concerns for forensic 
searches, it left much to be desired from the conversation 
surrounding privacy intrusions from manual searches.  
2. Fourth Circuit 
The Fourth Circuit followed in Cotterman’s footsteps five 
years later.126 In United States v. Kolsuz, customs agents 
detained the defendant, Hamza Kolsuz, at Washington Dulles 
International Airport after they found firearm parts in his 
luggage.127 Kolsuz intended to board a flight to Turkey.128 
Instead, the agents arrested him and subjected his 
smartphone to a month-long, off-site forensic analysis that 
yielded a nearly 900-page report.129 In the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Kolsuz was 
convicted of attempting and conspiring to smuggle firearms 
out of the country after his motion to suppress the forensic 
data report was denied.130 
On appeal, Kolsuz argued that (1) the border exception no 
longer applied once he and his phone were in government 
custody, and (2) post-Riley, a warrant based on probable cause 
is required for forensic phone searches.131 The Fourth Circuit 
swiftly rejected Kolsuz’s first argument, finding that the 
temporal and spatial distance between Kolsuz and the off-site 
analysis did not escape the border exception’s broad reach.132 
 
124 See United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1009 (9th Cir. 2008); see 
also Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 960 (acknowledging approval of “a quick look 
and unintrusive search of laptops”). 
125 Id. at 1005. 
126 See United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133 (4th Cir. 2018). 
127 See id. at 136. 
128 Id. 
129 Id.  
130 Id.  
131 Id. at 136–37. 
132 See id. at 137. 
  
No. 2:696] CAN WE CURATE IT? 717 
The second argument did not find more success, as the court 
also found that the post-arrest timing of the search did not 
trigger Riley’s search-incident-to-arrest.133 The court did find, 
however, that Riley demanded some form of individualized 
suspicion for forensic searches (whether that form is 
reasonable suspicion or warrant for probable cause was left 
unanswered).134  
The court did pointedly separate “manual” from “forensic.” 
The officers’ pre-arrest use of the iPhone’s touch screen to 
scroll through Kolsuz’s recent calls and text messages was a 
manual search.135 A forensic search, on the other hand, 
transpired when a computer forensic agent used a Cellebrite 
Physical Analyzer to extract the following data: “personal 
contact lists, emails, messenger conversations, photographs, 
videos, calendar, web browsing history, and call logs, along 
with a history of Kolsuz’s physical location down to precise 
GPS coordinates.”136 The court further bolstered this 
dichotomy by grouping the forensic search with other non-
routine searches requiring individualized suspicion, such as 
“strip searches, alimentary-canal searches, x-rays and the 
like,” and setting them aside from routine searches of luggage 
and outer clothing.137 Kolsuz may have left the level of 
individualized suspicion undecided, but this much was made 
clear: Forensic searches of electronics post Riley are non-
routine searches meriting heightened special treatment.  
 
133 See id. at 142 (citing United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 503 (4th 
Cir. 2005)). 
134 See id. at 146 (“After Riley, we think it is clear that a forensic search 
of a digital phone must be treated as a nonroutine border search, requiring 
some form of individualized suspicion.”) (emphasis added); see also id. at 148 
(“Accordingly, we need not—and will not—reach the issue of whether more 
than reasonable suspicion is required for a search of this nature in affirming 
the judgment of the district court.”).  
135 Id. at 139. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. at 144–45. 
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B. The Eleventh Circuit Requires No Suspicion for 
Forensic Searches 
In an unexpected turn, the Eleventh Circuit unequivocally 
rejected its sister circuits’ approach later that same year, 
remarking in United States v. Touset, “we are 
unpersuaded.”138 Not only did the Eleventh Circuit find that 
border agents had reasonable suspicion to search Karl 
Touset’s electronics, but the court squarely rejected any 
argument that Riley required reasonable suspicion.139 The 
facts in Touset were similar to those in Cotterman. In both 
cases, officers had more than an inchoate and 
unparticularized suspicion—here, the government knew that 
Karl Touset sent three low-money transfers to a bank account, 
that the account in question was associated with a Philippine 
phone number tied to an email account containing an image 
of child pornography, and that the Philippines was a popular 
source country of child pornography.140 The district court 
sentenced Touset to ten years imprisonment and lifetime 
supervision.141 And as at issue in Cotterman, the government 
subjected Touset’s electronics to a forensic search. So why the 
difference? 
The court simply perceived no reason why the Fourth 
Amendment would require suspicion for a forensic search of 
an electronic device when it imposes no such requirement of a 
like search of personal property, despite obvious qualitative 
differences. It stated:  
And it does not make sense to say that electronic 
devices should receive special treatment because so 
many people now own them or because they can store 
vast quantities of records or effects. The same could be 
said for a recreational vehicle filled with personal 
 
138 United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1234 (11th Cir. 2018). 
139 Id. at 1229. 
140 Id. at 1230.  
141 Id. at 1231. 
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effects or a tractor-trailer loaded with boxes of 
documents.142 
The court also rejected the Fourth Circuit’s reliance on 
Riley as the fodder for a heightened suspicion requirement.143 
While acknowledging the significant intrusion on one’s 
privacy resulting from a cell phone search, the Eleventh 
Circuit echoed its recent holding in United States v. Vergara, 
denying Riley’s applicability to border searches.144  
Riley aside, the Eleventh Circuit first bluntly categorized 
a forensic search of an electronic device as a search of 
property.145 The court also distinguished property searches 
from searches of a person’s body.146 In the case of body 
searches, the Eleventh Circuit examined the “personal 
indignity” of the search, not its extensiveness.147 In weighing 
personal indignity, the court considered several factors, such 
as physical contact with the agent conducting the search, 
exposure of intimate body parts, and the use of force.148 The 
court then applied these factors to explicitly rebuke 
Cotterman’s comparison of a forensic search to a “computer 
strip search[:]” “[a] forensic search of an electronic device is 
not like a strip search or an x-ray; it does not require border 
agents to touch a traveler’s body, to expose intimate body 
parts, or to use any physical force against him.”149 
Lastly, the court made a specific point about child 
pornography. The court considered a requirement of 
additional suspicion to be the equivalent of affording “special 
protection for the property most often used to store and 
 
142 Id. at 1233.  
143 See id. at 1234. 
144 Id. In Vergara, the Eleventh Circuit noted, “the Supreme Court 
expressly limited its holding [in Riley] to the search-incident-to-arrest 
exception.” United States v. Vergara, 884 F.3d 1309, 1312 (11th Cir. 2018). 
145 See United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1234 (11th Cir. 2018) 
(“Although it may intrude on the privacy of the owner, a forensic search of 
an electronic device is a search of property.”). 
146 See id. at 1234. 
147 Id. 
148 See id. 
149 Id. 
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disseminate child pornography.”150 In this case, Touset 
travelled with multiple laptops, external hard drives, iPhones 
and a camera.151 Given the proliferation of child pornography 
on the internet, law enforcement officers must rely on forensic 
searches of electronic devices as a common investigatory 
method152—one which the court worried would be impeded by 
a heightened constitutional requirement of suspicion.153 
IV. THE SMARTPHONE DIFFERENCE: A SHIFT ON 
THE SPECTRUM FROM GOVERNMENT 
INTERESTS TOWARD INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY 
INTERESTS 
As Riley makes clear, smartphones are different from other 
personal belongings.154 While they fall into a broader 
classification of electronic devices, they are distinct in their 
technological makeup and everyday use. The “Swiss army 
knife” of mobile devices, smartphones are Americans’ go-to-
devices for a range of activities, from checking social networks 
to reading the news.155 Smartphones are held so closely that 
they have been compared to an additional limb, a “feature of 
human anatomy.”156 People wake up to their alarms, do not 
leave their homes without them, and check them on average 
fifty-two times throughout the day.157  
The collective information smartphones reveal is 
astounding: personal conversations via text, private emails, 
 
150 Id. at 1235. 
151 Id. at 1230. 
152 See id. at 1236. 
153 Id. (warning that the court "should not invent heightened 
constitutional protection for travelers who cross our borders with this 
contraband in tow”). 
154 See supra notes 72–75 and accompanying text.  
155 DELOITTE, 2018 GLOBAL MOBILE CONSUMER SURVEY: US EDITION 4 




156 Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014). 
157 GLOBAL MOBILE CONSUMER SURVEY, supra note 155, at 3. 
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financial records and confidential business documents, 
medical records, web browser history, contacts and call 
history, location data and history, photos and videos, steps 
walked, Snaps, and romantic matches.158 This list goes on. 
Many of these differences, however, are also applicable to 
laptops and their tablet cousins, as smartphones are 
“[e]ssentially tiny computers.”159 Indeed, Cambridge 
Dictionary defines “smartphone” as “a mobile phone that can 
be used as a small computer and that connects to the 
internet[.]”160 With these factors in mind, courts should 
reevaluate the border exception as applied to cell phones.  
As mentioned in Section II.C, the government’s authority 
to protect the nation from contraband is well-documented. 
This right, grounded in state-sovereignty, may be 
“heightened” by “national cris[e]s” ranging from illegal drug-
smuggling to international terrorism.161 While the nexus 
between the border exception and traditionally excluded 
contraband like “communicable diseases, narcotics, or 
explosives”162 is readily apparent, the line blurs for electronic 
contraband. Of course, physical contraband may be hidden in 
the cavities of an electronic device. Such contraband, however, 
could be revealed during a mandatory conveyor belt security 
scan. But electronic contraband—an illicit file, for example—
is “borderless.”163 At the click of a mouse, it can be sent, 
 
158 See Smartphone Privacy, PRIVACY RTS. CLEARINGHOUSE, 
https://www.privacyrights.org/consumer-guides/smartphone-privacy 
[https://perma.cc/LY9D-CS6S] (last modified Dec. 19, 2017); see also United 
States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 964 (9th Cir. 2013) (“They contain the 
most intimate details of our lives: financial records, confidential business 
documents, medical records and private emails”).  
159 Smartphone Privacy, supra note 158; see also Riley, 573 U.S. at 393 
(characterizing cell phones as “minicomputers that also happen to have the 
capacity to be used as a telephone”).  
160 Smartphone, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cambridge. 
org/us/dictionary/english/smartphone [https://perma.cc/Z2FG-YHQH]. 
161 Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 966 (quoting United States v. Montoya de 
Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985)). 
162 Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 544.  
163 United States v. Vergara, 884 F.3d 1309, 1317 (11th Cir. 2018) 
(Pryor, Jill, J., dissenting). 
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opened, and viewed without ever physically crossing the 
United States border.164  
The border search exception for property is not as absolute 
as the Eleventh Circuit maintains.165 Eventually, a “search 
initiated at the border could become so attenuated from the 
rationale for the border search exception that it no longer 
would fall under the exception.”166 With the exception of child 
pornography—which is “borderless”—most searches of 
smartphones merely further the potential for discovery of 
physical contraband.167 While the order of discovery in Kolsuz 
is in reverse (the agents found firearm parts first, then 
conducted an electronics search),168 the distinction between 
physical contraband and evidence thereof is nonetheless apt. 
If the search does not reveal contraband itself, but rather the 
location of contraband inside the border, it is one degree 
removed from the border search’s aim to “protect[] this Nation 
from entrants who may bring anything harmful into this 
country[.]”169 The more attenuated the rule is from its 
underlying justification of territorial integrity, the greater the 
shift toward individual privacy interests should be. The 
national security interests of keeping out “borderless” 
electronic contraband are arguably lesser than those of 
keeping out bombs or tuberculosis due to the nature of the 
particular dangers posed by “readily transportable chemical 
and biological weapons.”170 Similarly, the privacy interests 
inherent in a smartphone’s vast ecosystem of personal 
 
164 See id.  
165 See supra notes 142–44 and accompanying text. 
166 United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 143 (4th Cir. 2018) (citing 
United States v. Molina-Isidoro, 884 F.3d 287, 295–97 (5th Cir. 2018) 
(Costa, J., concurring)).  
167 See CBP DIRECTIVE, supra note 4, § 1 (recognizing that some 
searches may further the retrieval of evidence helpful in combating terrorist 
activity). 
168 See Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 136. 
169 Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 544 (emphasis added). 
170 United States v. Alfaro-Moncada, 607 F.3d 720, 730 (11th Cir. 
2010). 
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information are likely greater than those present in a carry-
on duffle bag.  
V. REASONABLE SUSPICION FOR MANUAL AND 
FORENSIC SEARCHES OF NON-FULLY CURATED 
DEVICES (“NFCDS”) 
Part V now takes the smartphone difference to its natural 
conclusion: Suspicionless searches of smartphones and 
laptops at the border no longer make sense. Smartphones and 
like devices, therefore, should be set apart from other 
possessions that fit comfortably within the border search 
exception regime. Section V.A argues that reasonable 
suspicion for both manual171 and forensic searches of 
smartphones and related devices is the appropriate standard 
that courts should employ. Section V.B distinguishes 
smartphones and their sister electronics from other 
electronics, both in their storage capacity and curability. 
Section V.C, however, posits that probable cause is too 
extreme a standard given the practical realities of the United 
States border. Finally, Section V.D explains why electronic 
devices that are fully curable—such as cameras—do not merit 
the same heightened suspicion and should be treated like any 
ordinary luggage piece subject to suspicionless searches at the 
border.  
A. The Current Distinction Between Manual and 
Forensic Searches of Cell Phones and Laptops Is 
Inapposite 
The privacy concerns articulated in Riley—access to an 
individual’s health-related browsing or location history172—
are not limited to forensic searches. A forensic search is more 
intrusive than a manual search, as it may unearth deleted 
files and analyze large quantities of data. But a sensitive work 
 
171 See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text (discussing manual 
searches). 
172 See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 396–97 (2014). 
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email, or the “significant locations” on your iPhone can be 
accessed without such a search.173 
The Ninth Circuit’s distinction between manual and 
forensic searches, therefore, does not hold water. The 
procedure of these two types of searches is, indeed, easily 
distinguishable. Officers may use common sense when 
differentiating between a manual review of files by hand and 
application of computer software to analyze the device.174 But 
the rationale behind the suspicion jump “is left 
unexplained.”175 Simply perusing an average smartphone 
user’s mobile application software (“apps”) by hand could 
easily reveal the “wealth of detail about her familial, political, 
professional, religious, and sexual associations” that the 
Supreme Court has considered worthy of Fourth Amendment 
protection.176  
Courts differentiating between manual searches and 
exhaustive forensic searches cite the “cursory” or “quick look” 
nature of manual searches.177 They fail to mention, however, 
that although the search in Cotterman, for example, was short 
in time relative to the longer forensic search, not all manual 
searches are, in fact, “cursory.” Further, even a fast scan can 
reveal precisely the type of sensitive information Riley deems 
special. For example, two of the plaintiffs in Alasaad v. 
Nielsen, a civil case currently pending before the United 
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, allege 
manual searches lasting about two hours, while a third 
 
173 “Significant Locations” permits “[y]our iPhone [to] keep track of 
places you have recently been, as well as how often and when you visited 
them, in order to learn places that are significant to you.” Location 
Services & Privacy, APPLE (Mar. 25, 2019), https://support.apple.com/en-
us/HT207056 [https://perma.cc/2GYM-NVNL]. While they cannot be read 
by Apple, “Significant Locations” would be easily viewable by a customs 
agent with access to the phone. See id.  
174 See United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 967 (9th Cir. 2013). 
175 Id. at 981 (Smith, J., dissenting).  
176 See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring). 
177 See Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 960; United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 
1003, 1010 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 502 (4th 
Cir. 2005). 
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plaintiff reports officers seizing his phone for about four 
hours.178 Moreover, yet another plaintiff allegedly withstood 
a manual search for one-and-one-half hours, but it would only 
have taken agents mere seconds to open her smartphone 
photo album and access private photographs of her without 
her headscarf.179 If the heart of the concern as articulated in 
Riley is the “cache of sensitive personal information”180 on a 
smartphone, then Cotterman’s forensic search requirement 
should be rethought.  
Some are beginning to challenge the black and white divide 
between manual and forensic searches.181 Although bound by 
Cotterman’s holding, the district court in United States v. 
Caballero lamented that if it “were free to decide the question 
in the first instance, it would hold that the warrantless 
[manual] cell phone search under these circumstances would 
be unreasonable.”182 Another district court, in United States 
v. Ramos, suggested that applying Cotterman’s reasonable 
suspicion standard to all border searches of cell phones “may 
be a prudent way to harmonize Riley’s concerns with the 
salutary border search principles.”183  
 
178 See Alasaad v. Nielsen, No. 17-CV-11730, 2018 WL 2170323, at *6–
7 (D. Mass. May 9, 2018). 
179 See id. at *5. 
180 Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 395 (2014). 
181 See Eunice Park, The Elephant in the Room: What Is A “Nonroutine” 
Border Search, Anyway? Digital Device Searches Post-Riley, 44 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 277, 312–14 (2017); see also United States v. Caballero, 178 F. 
Supp. 3d 1008, 1017 (S.D. Cal. 2016). 
182 Caballero, 178 F. Supp. 3d at 1017. The circumstances involved a 
post-arrest manual search of defendant’s cell phone which revealed a 
photograph of a large sum of money. Id. at 1011–12. 
183 United States v. Ramos, 190 F. Supp. 3d 992, 1002 (S.D. Cal. 2016). 
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B. The Luggage Piece: Why Smartphones and Like 
Devices Deserve More Protection Than Other 
Electronic Devices 
1. Storage Capacity 
Quantity matters. While a “recreational vehicle filled with 
personal effects or a tractor-trailer loaded with boxes of 
documents”184 indeed contain a very large number of items, 
the scale is dwarfed by the amount of information on 
smartphones and laptop hard drives.185 Smartphones have 
internal memory capacities of up to 128 gigabytes,186 while 
laptop drives can range from 160 gigabytes to over two 
terabytes in capacity.187 To put this quantity in perspective, 
one gigabyte is equivalent to a single pick-up truck full of 
paper, whereas one terabyte (1000 gigabytes) is the volume of 
paper produced from a forest of 50,000 trees.188 In other 
words, one hard drive may hold the paper equivalent of more 
than twice the number of trees in Central Park.189 The 
absolute difference between one tractor-trailer and one 
hundred matters less than how that increased quantity 
 
184 United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1233 (11th Cir. 2018). 
185 See United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 964 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(en banc) (“The average 400–gigabyte laptop hard drive can store over 200 
million pages . . . . [and] [e]ven a car full of packed suitcases with sensitive 
documents cannot hold a candle to the sheer, ever-increasing, capacity of 
digital storage”). 
186 Davidson v. Apple, Inc., No. 16-CV-04942, 2018 WL 2325426, at *21 
(N.D. Cal. May 8, 2018). 
187 Mark Kyrnin, Guide to Laptop Storage Drives, LIFEWIRE (Nov. 15, 
2018), https://www.lifewire.com/laptop-storage-drives-guide-833445 
[https://perma.cc/Q7WP-35V7]. 
188 Tony R. DeMars, Big Data, in COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY 
UPDATE & FUNDAMENTALS 305, 307 (August E. Grant & Jennifer H. 
Meadows eds., 2018). 
189 See Jessica Sain-Baird, What Are Central Park’s Most Colorful Fall 
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changes the practicality of deleting or temporarily moving 
files.190 
2. Curability 
To more precisely distinguish between traditional luggage 
and electronic devices, this Note proposes separating devices 
into two broad categories: (1) Non-Fully Curated Devices 
(“NFCDs”), such as smartphones, laptops, tablets, and 
wearables, and (2) Fully Curated Devices (“FCDs”), such as 
digital and video cameras, GoPros, eReaders, thumb-drives 
and floppy disks, and portable game consoles. “Curate” is 
defined as “select[ing] things such as documents, music, 
products, or internet content to be included as part of a list or 
collection.”191 Indeed, it is the point of curating, or actively 
choosing, that most strongly separates NFCDs from 
traditional luggage and therefore justifies a special treatment 
of reasonable suspicion for manual and forensic searches. 
When one travels, one decides “what papers to take and what 
to leave behind.”192 This is easily done when packing a 
suitcase or briefcase, but is far more difficult with a 
smartphone or laptop. It is true that a user may delete or 
transfer certain files in anticipation of travel, making the 
device partially-curated. But, not only may the task of 
removing unnecessary files prove to be an impractical solution 
given the volume, it may actually be unfeasible given the two-
way nature of information sharing facilitated on many 
NFCDs.193 Users do not stop receiving emails, photographs, 
Snapchats, texts, calls, dating app matches, or payment 
 
190 United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 987 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(Smith, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1010 
(9th Cir. 2008) (“[C]ase law does not support a finding that a search which 
occurs in an otherwise ordinary manner, is ‘particularly offensive’ simply 
due to the storage capacity of the object being searched.”).  
191 Curate, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cambridge. 
org/us/dictionary/english/curate [https://perma.cc/MC7T-9FEY]. 
192 Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 965.  
193 See generally Editorial, Smartphones and the 4th Amendment, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 27, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/28/opinion/ 
smartphones-and-the-4th-amendment.html [https://perma.cc/Y8FS-RZAT].  
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requests from friends at the airport after they decide what to 
bring and what to leave. Smartphones are analogous to a 
world in which family, business associates, and friends could 
continuously add items to a traveler’s suitcase from anywhere 
without the traveler’s knowledge. A person’s “expectation of 
privacy is less at the border,”194 but it is not null; the 
inconvenience of standard screening procedures pales in 
comparison to a peek inside a traveler’s communications and 
electronic papers—which they may have not even yet viewed. 
In addition to the potential for the receipt of new files, an 
individual’s smartphone itself may amass data unbeknownst 
to its users.195 Smartphones are packed with sensors that 
automatically read the phone’s surroundings such as light, 
pressure, temperature, and proximity to other objects.196 This 
data may seem non-threatening, but it is vulnerable to abuse: 
Google Play recently banned twenty apps from Android 
phones that could “record with the microphone, monitor a 
phone’s location, take photos, and then extract the data,”197 
all without the user’s knowledge. Sensor data collection not 
only raises concerns of outside spying, but further spotlights 
users’ loosening grip over their non-curated data.  
The curation argument is analogous to the voluntary 
sharing argument raised in Carpenter.198 Just as it is 
unreasonable to expect that a cell phone user “voluntarily” 
shares her “comprehensive dossier of physical movements” 
merely by powering on the smartphone,199 it is unreasonable 
to equate the affirmative act of packing a suitcase to preparing 
a smartphone for travel. Moreover, despite the sky-high 
number of smartphone owners, knowledge of how the devices 
 
194 United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 154 (2004). 
195 Maria Temming, Your Phone Is Like a Spy in Your Pocket, SCIENCE 
NEWS (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.sciencenews.org/article/smartphones-
data-collection-security-privacy [https://perma.cc/SK8P-G9L3]. 
196 Id.  
197 Id.  
198 See supra note 89 and accompanying text.  
199 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018). 
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work varies.200 If it is virtually impossible for a traveler to be 
fully aware of her NFCD’s universe of data, neither she nor 
those with lesser technological literacy can be fully aware. 
C. A Warrant Requirement, However, Is Impractical 
at the Border 
There is not a single case suggesting that a border search—
no matter how invasive—requires more than reasonable 
suspicion.201 Indeed, the highest standard that the Supreme 
Court has applied at the border is reasonable suspicion.202 
Nearly five years have passed since Riley, and while courts 
have disagreed over whether forensic searches merit 
increased suspicion, they all appear to stop shy of probable 
cause or choose to avoid the question.203 That is not to say, 
however, that Congress cannot decide otherwise. Two 
proposed bills advocate for probable cause warrants with 
respect to forensic searches.204  
Nonetheless, warrants face greater practicability concerns 
at the border. Obtaining warrants at the border is more 
burdensome due to the large volume of items moving across 
the border with the added difficulty of obtaining a warrant 
when the subject of the search is mobile.205 Furthermore, the 
 
200 See Paul E. Ketelaar & Mark van Balen, The Smartphone as Your 
Follower: The Role of Smartphone Literacy in the Relation Between Privacy 
Concerns, Attitude and Behaviour Towards Phone-Embedded Tracking, 78 
COMPUTERS IN HUM. BEHAV. 174, 175 (2018). 
201 See United States v. Molina-Isidoro, 884 F.3d 287, 292 (5th Cir. 
2018) (“[N]o post-Riley decision . . . has required a warrant for a border 
search of an electronic device.”). 
202 See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 
(1985).  
203 See supra Section III.A.2. 
204 See Protecting Data at the Border Act, S. 823, 115th Cong. (2017) 
(arguing for a warrant for manual and forensic searches); S. 2462, 115th 
Cong. (2018) (arguing for reasonable suspicion prior to basic or manual 
searches and a probable cause warrant for forensic searches). 
205 See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925) (allowing the 
search of a vehicle without a warrant when obtaining one before the vehicle 
left the area was impracticable). 
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exigent circumstances doctrine,206 which excuses compliance 
with the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, overlaps 
with the border exception. Many national security interests 
propping up the border exception also create exigent 
situations and therefore could separately caution against a 
warrant requirement.207 Moreover, while the process of 
obtaining warrants is becoming increasingly speedy with the 
use of electronic warrant applications, such alternatives are 
not available in every state.208  
D. No Suspicion for FCDs 
Cameras, iPods, thumb-drives, GoPros, e-readers, and 
handheld game consoles are all fully curated devices in the 
sense that users have the capacity of knowing—and 
curating—the devices’ contents. In Cotterman, the officer 
could open and view image files on Cotterman’s cameras while 
the Cottermans waited to enter the country.209 Little would 
have changed if Cotterman brought these photographs in 
traditional print photo albums. If an international traveler 
can mitigate the intrusion occasioned by a routine luggage 
search by leaving behind certain photographs or other 
contraband, she can also choose which photos to keep on her 
camera. 
Indeed, Judge Amy Coney Barrett alluded to this critical 
distinction during oral arguments in a Seventh Circuit child 
 
206 See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393–94 (“[W]arrants are 
generally required to search a person’s home or his person unless ‘the 
exigencies of the situation’ make the needs of law enforcement so compelling 
that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment.”). 
207 See Laura Nowell, Note, Privacy at the Border: Applying the Border 
Search Exception to Digital Searches at the United States Border, 71 FED. 
COMM. L.J. 85, 101 (2018) (“The knowledge of an imminent threat to public 
safety creates the circumstances necessary to invoke the exigent 
circumstances and justifies a search without a warrant[.])” 
208 See Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 172 (2013) (noting that “[a]t 
least 30 States provide for electronic warrant applications”). 
209 See United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 957–58 (9th Cir. 
2013).  
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pornography case, United States v. Wanjiku, when she 
questioned defense counsel about whether a digital camera 
lacked Riley concerns, such as sensitive browsing history.210 
Unlike a smartphone, a camera is not vulnerable to the 
unknowing receipt of another’s photographs.211 Moreover, a 
camera does not map historical travel patterns, group photos 
by location, or pin them to a digital map.212  
Requiring no suspicion for searches of FCDs has practical 
implications for the way Americans travel and make pre-
departure decisions. In choosing whether to travel with 
personal photos, any added benefit from printing and carrying 
the photographs or storing them on a camera must be 
counterbalanced with the cost of a heightened search risk. The 
 
210 Oral Argument at 6:25, United States v. Wanjiku, 919 F.3d 472 (7th 
Cir. 2019), https://www.courtlistener.com/audio/59635/united-states-v-
donald-wanjiku/ [https://perma.cc/Q9PW-48U4]. In Wanjiku, the Seventh 
Circuit refused to adopt either Wanjiku’s position that a forensic search of 
his electronics required probable cause or the government’s position that 
such searches require no suspicion at all; instead, the court upheld the lower 
court’s denial of Wanjiku’s motion to suppress evidence from his electronics 
because the agents acted in good faith when they conducted the search with 
reasonable suspicion at a time when no court had ever required more. See 
Wanjiku, 919 F.3d 472. 
211 For example, WhatsApp is a cross-platform instant messaging app 
that relies on the internet. In January 2017, the app had more than 1.2 
billion monthly active users worldwide. WhatsApp – Statistics & Facts, 
STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/topics/2018/whatsapp/ [https://perma. 
cc/X6ZY-VMJL]. Photographs and videos sent over WhatsApp appear 
immediately in the recipient’s photo gallery. See Configuring Auto 
Download, WHATSAPP, https://faq.whatsapp.com/en/android/23248698/? 
category=5245251 [https://perma.cc/Q4HF-D7KG]. “By default, WhatsApp 
will automatically download images over your cellular connection to provide 
you with quick access to your latest photos.” Id. “Automatically downloaded 
media will show up in your gallery.” Id. 
212 “The iOS Photos app automatically groups pictures you take into a 
Places album – as long as you have the location services feature enabled on 
your phone when you are snapping your shots. The Photos software reads 
the GPS information embedded in each picture file to sort images, and then 
displays the images accordingly on a map within the app.” J.D. Biersdorfer, 
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calculus is necessarily more complicated when travel isn’t 
strictly for leisure. To the extent that businesses entrust their 
employees with sensitive business information, such 
information would be more vulnerable to unintended review 
by officers if housed, for example, on a company USB flash 
drive than on a laptop. Thumb drives may garner less 
attention alongside the growth of NFCDs, but the global flash 
memory market is projected to see growth over the next few 
years, so they should not be discounted in the near term.213 
Critics may point out that it may be difficult to distinguish 
between NFCDs and FCDs, with some sub-categories of 
electronic devices falling into a gray area.214 However, TSA 
agents are trained to distinguish between many prohibited 
and allowed property items, and travelers likewise must pay 
careful attention to fluid ounce requirements and security line 
instructions.215 Therefore, it is not unreasonable for a traveler 
to understand that her camera and smartphone might be 
subject to different suspicion thresholds under the Fourth 
Amendment.  
Despite advances in NFCDs, such as the smartphone’s 
photography capability, the camera market is expected to 
 
213 In 2021, the flash memory market is expected to be worth $64.24 
billion U.S. dollars worldwide. See Flash Memory Market Revenues 
Worldwide from 2013 to 2021 (in Billion U.S. Dollars), STATISTA, 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/553556/worldwide-flash-memory-
market-size/ [https://perma.cc/7GZB-79KA]. 
214 One could argue, for example, that certain Kindles are not e-
readers, but tablets. Indeed, this is true of a Kindle Fire. But this distinction 
is not too difficult to make. While e-readers are designed for reading e-books, 
tablets offer a whole suite of features, in addition to reading e-books, such 
as e-mail and web access. See generally Marc Saltzman, E-Book Readers vs 
Tablets: Which One Is Right for You?, USA TODAY (Feb. 23, 2014), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/columnist/saltzman/2014/02/23/eread
ers-vs-tablets/5575963/ [https://perma.cc/7QS9-XLGE]. 
215 The TSA Academy trains its employees through props, including 
prohibited and non-prohibited travel items under various mock scenarios. 
See Rachel Gillett, ‘You’re at War’: I Went Inside the New TSA Academy, 
Where Officers Learn to Detect Bombs, Spot Weapons, and Find Out Why 
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continue growing over the next four years. Indeed, the high-
speed camera market, valued at $288 million in 2018, is 
projected to reach $422 million by 2023.216 Therefore, the 
curability standard may not be the solution ten years from 
now. But given the healthy market growth forecast for at least 
certain FCDs, they are likely to continue to accompany 
travelers internationally and remain vulnerable to illegal 
misuse.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
The current circuit split over the degree of suspicion 
required for forensic searches of electronic devices is deeply 
problematic. It is grossly unjust that a traveler arriving in 
Miami maintains a diminished expectation of privacy in their 
electronics compared to a traveler arriving in San Francisco. 
In light of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Riley and 
Carpenter, the unique privacy concerns presented by 
smartphones and related devices belie the common sense of a 
suspicion gap between manual and forensic searches. But the 
solution cannot stop at a reasonable suspicion requirement for 
all searches of electronic devices as a categorical matter. 
Because FCDs (such as digital cameras) do not pose the same 
privacy risks as NFCDs (such as smartphones), it is 
reasonable for a traveler to expect a suspicionless search of 
the files with which she elects to travel.  
The CBP directive could help fix this gap in the case law, 
and is subject to review and potential modifications every 
three years.217 The current directive defines “electronic 
device” as “[a]ny device that may contain information in an 
electronic or digital form, such as computers, tablets, disks, 
drives, tapes, mobile phones and other communication 
 
216 High-speed Camera Market by Usage, Frame Rate (1,000–5,000, 
>5,000–20,000, >20,000–100,000, >100,00), Resolution (2-5MP, and >5MP), 
Throughput, Component, Accessory, Application, and Geography – Global 
Forecast to 2023, RES. & MKTS., (Nov. 2018), 
https://www.researchandmarkets.com/research/g9n6br/highspeed_camera?
w=4 [https://perma.cc/9BZA-JVWG]. 
217 See CBP DIRECTIVE, supra note 4. 
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devices, cameras, music and other media players.”218 In light 
of the differences between NFCDs and FCDs and the Supreme 
Court’s special recognition of modern cell phones in Riley and 
Carpenter, drafters should consider revising this language to 
account for the privacy concerns specific to NFCDs. 
 
 
218 Id. § 3.2. 
